Game theory provides a framework within which to model multiagent systems. The conventional neoclassical theory is well suited for competitive scenarios where self-interest is the dominant concept of rational behavior, but is less appropriate for scenarios where opportunities for such complex social behavior as cooperation, compromise, and unselfishness are significant. Conditional game theory is an extension of the conventional neoclassical theory that permits agents to extend their spheres of interest beyond the self and enables them to condition their preferences on the preferences of other agents, thereby providing a mechanism with which to characterize complex social behavior. As these conditional preferences propagate through the system, social bonds are created among the players that permit notions of both group and individual preferences to emerge and, hence, for concepts of both group rationality and individual rationality to coexist. Computational complexity can often be mitigated by exploiting the sparseness of influence relationships among the members of the system.
INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a mathematical framework within which to model decisions by multiple entities where the outcome for each depends on the choices of all. Game theory is increasingly invoked by engineering and computer science as a framework for multiagent systems (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009; Nisan et al., 2007; Vlassis, 2007; Parsons et al., 2002; Weiss, 1999) .
A noncooperative, single-stage, strategic-form game consists of (i) a set of autonomous decision makers, or players, denoted X X X n = {X 1 , . . . , X n } where n ≥ 2, (ii) an action set A i for each X i , and (iii) a utility u X i : A A A → R for each X i , i = 1, . . . , n, where A A A = A 1 × · · · × A n is the product action space. For any action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A A A , the utility u X i (a), defines the benefit to X i as a consequence of the instantiation of a. These utilities are categorical in the sense that u X i (a) unconditionally defines the benefit to X i of the group instantiating the action profile a, ostensibly without regard for the benefit that instantiating a offers to other agents.
In addition to the categorical structure of the utilities, it is usually assumed that each X i possesses a logical structure that defines how it should play the game. The most widely used logical structure is the doctrine of individual rationality: each X i should act in a way that maximizes is own utility, regardless of the effect doing so has on others. Under the assumption that each player subscribes to this notion and believes that all others do so as well, they each will solve their corresponding constrained optimization problem, resulting in a Nash equilibrium.
The mathematical structure of categorical utilities and the logical structure of individual rationality are ideally matched to each other. Given categorical utilities, the only compatible notion of rationality is selfinterest, since the utility is restricted to, and only to, the individual's interests. Conversely, given individual rationality, any structure other than categorical utilities would extend interest beyond the self.
These mathematical and logical structures may provide an appropriate vehicle with which to model behavior in an environment of competition and market driven expectations since, in that environment, the dominant notion of rational behavior clearly is selfinterest. It is less clear, however, that self-interest is the dominant notion in mixed-motive environments, such as those that contain opportunities for cooperation, compromise, and unselfishness as well as for competition, intractability, and avarice. Arrow clearly delimits the context in which individual rationality applies: "rationality in application is not merely a property of the individual. Its useful and powerful implications derive from the conjunction of individual rationality and other basic concepts of neoclassical theory-equilibrium, competition, and completeness of markets . . . When these assumptions fail, the very concept of rationality becomes threatened, because perceptions of others and, in particular, their rationality become part of one's own rationality" (Arrow, 1986, p. 203) . Despite Arrow's caution, the mathematical and logical structures of game theory are routinely applied to mixed-motive situations, often producing results that are at variance with observed behavior. Behavioral economics (e.g., see (Camerer, 2003) ) seeks to mitigate this problem by inserting parameters to model fairness, loss aversion, and other such issues into the utilities to provide more psychological realism. Once included, however, the game is still solved according to conventional individual rationality and categorical utilities.
What is missing with conventional game theory is a notion of group benefit. Multiagent systems are typically designed such that the individuals work in a cooperative manner to accomplish some task, but, unfortunately, relying on individual rationality does not foster group rationality. As observed by Luce and Raiffa, "the notion of group rationality is neither a postulate of the model nor does it appear to follow as a logical consequence of individual rationality . . . general game theory seems to be in part a sociological theory which does not include any sociological assumptions, and, although one might hope one day to derive sociological theory from individual psychology, it may be too much to ask that any sociology be derived from the single assumption of individual rationality" (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p. 193, 196) . Consequently, game theory has proceeded by making assumptions about individual preferences only and then using those preferences to deduce information about the choices (but not the values) of a group.
It might be expected that cooperative game theory possesses some notion of group rationality. This version of game theory permits a subset of players to enter into a coalition such that each receives a payoff that is greater than it would receive if it acted alone. However, cooperative game theory employs categorical utilities and its solutions concepts are based squarely upon the assumption of individual rationality. Each player enters into a coalition solely on the basis of benefit to itself and, even though each may be better off for having joined, a notion of "group benefit" is not an issue when forming the coalition.
The need to extend beyond individual rationality is critical to the design of multiagent systems. With the social and behavioral sciences, game theory models are used as analysis tools to explain, predict, justify, and recommend courses of action, but the models are not causal; they are approximations to reality, and do not dictate behavior. With the engineering and computer science applications, however, game theory models are used as synthesis tools to design artificial autonomous entities. Such models are causal; they do dictate behavior; they create reality. Thus, when synthesizing social behavior, all social relationships must explicitly be part of the mathematical and logical models.
Reliance on categorical utilities and individual rationality limits the application of conventional game theory for the design and synthesis of multiagent systems that are intended to be cooperative. The contributions of this paper are (i) to present a new utility structure that overcomes the limitations of categorical utilities as a model of complex social relationships, (ii) to offer a more general concept of rational behavior that simultaneously accounts for both group an individual welfare, and (iii) to address and control the computational complexity of the resulting model.
PREFERENCE MODELS

Neoclassical Preference Models
The most prevalent assumption employed by game theory when considering preference orderings is also the most simple: a preference ordering over alternatives is defined for each individual agent. Arrow put it succinctly: "It is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable social states, in terms of their desirability to him . . . It is simply assumed that the individual orders all social states by whatever standards he deems relevant" (Arrow, 1951, p. 17) . According to this view, each agent's preference ordering is completely defined and immutable before the game begins. Thus, from the conventional point of view, the starting point of a game is the definition of categorical utilities for each player. Furthermore, as Friedman argues, it is not necessary to consider the process by which the agents arrive at their preference orderings. "The economist has little to say about the formation of wants; this is the province of the psychologist. The economist's task is to trace the consequences of any given set of wants" (Friedman, 1961, p. 13) .
If we take the Arrow/Friedman division of labor as the starting point when defining a game, we must assume that the individual is able to reconcile all internal conflicts to the point that a unique categorical preference ordering can be defined that corresponds to its own self interest and which is not susceptible to change as a result of social interaction. This is a tall order, but nothing less will do if we are restricted to categorical preference orderings.
Social Influence Preference Models
When complex social relationships exist for which categorical preferences are not adequate or appropriate, a natural way for a player to take them into account is by the notion of influence. There are many ways to account for social influence, but the approach presented in this paper is to apply a set of principles to define a systematic and logically defensible mathematical model that leads to the definition and implementation of a multiagent decision methodology that accounts for influence relationships when they exist and treats conventional game theory as a special case when such relationships are absent.
Principle 1 (Conditioning).
Agents' preferences may be influenced by the preferences of other agents.
X j influences X i if X i 's preferences are affected by X j 's preferences. Without knowledge of X j 's preferences, X i is in a state of suspense with respect to its own preferences. Essentially, X j 's preferences propagate through the group to affect X i 's preferences, thereby generating a social bond between the two agents. Once such a bond exists, it is possible to define a notion of joint preference for the two agents viewed simultaneously, and it is possible to extract individual preference orderings from this joint preference ordering since, once X j 's preferences are revealed, X i need no longer remain in suspense. It is thus be possible for both group and individual preferences to co-exist.
Principle 1 represents an important shift in perspective from conventional game theory. With the conventional approach, the utility of an individual defines its self-interest with respect to the instantiation of actions taken by all players. By contrast, we view the utility of an individual as the consequent of a hypothetical proposition whose antecedent is the assumption that those who influence it have identified their most preferred outcomes.
Definition 1.
A conjecture for X j is an action profile, denoted a j , that is hypothesized as X j 's most preferred outcome. Let X X X m = {X j 1 , . . . , X j m } be a subgroup of X X X n . A joint conjecture for X X X m , denoted Given a joint conjecture α α α m , the consequent of the hypothetical proposition is a conditional utility for X i . Definition 2. Let X X X m = {X j 1 , . . . , X j m } be a subgroup of X X X n that influences X i and let α α α m = {a j 1 , · · · , a j m } be a joint conjecture for X X X m . A conditional utility u X i |Xm (·|α α α m ) is a real-valued function defined over A A A that specifies the preference ordering for X i given the joint conjecture α α α m . That is,
Each X i must define a conditional utility for the joint conjectures of the subgroup that influences it. This requirement increases the complexity of a problem statement over the conventional requirement of specifying only one categorical utility for each X i . However, as we shall explore in Section 5, there often will be ways to simplify the specification that keeps the complexity under control. Nevertheless, the inclusion of social influence will generally result in increased complexity.
Group Preference
Conventional game theory eschews the notion of group preference, primarily on the grounds that the group is not a "superplayer" that possesses the power to make decisions. Shubik put it this way: "It may be meaningful, in a given setting, to say that a group 'chooses' or 'decides' something. It is rather less likely to be meaningful to say that the group 'wants' or 'prefers' something" (Shubik, 1982, p. 124) . The only exception to this dictum is the principle of unanimity: if all members of a group most prefer the same outcome, then the group most prefers that outcome.
Once we extend beyond self-interest via social bonds induced by conditional utilities, however, it becomes possible to consider a more general notion of group preference. It may happen that the social bonds are so strong that unanimity will result, but that situation will not generally obtain. If agents disagree regarding what is best, then some degree of conflict, or discord, will exist within the group. Thus, when designing a system whose members must coordinate, a critical issue is the concordance, or the degree of harmony, among its members.
When k > 1, the concordance utility is a generalization of individual utility which, rather than providing a preference ordering for a single agent over the space A A A of action profiles, provides a concordance ordering for a k-member subgroup over the product space A A A k of joint conjectures. When a i 1 = · · · = a i k , the concordance utility measures the degree of harmony if all members conjecture the same action profile. When the conjectures are different, U X k (a i 1 , . . . , a i k ) measures the degree of concordance that exists among the members of the subgroup if each X i l were to view a i l as its most-preferred outcome. The expression
causes a more severe conflict for the group than does α α α k .
Definition 4.
fined over A A A k that defines a concordance utility for X X X k given that X X X m jointly conjectures α α α m . When k = 1, the concordance utility becomes a conditional utility for
Example 1. Suppose the group {X 1 , X 2 , X 3 } is to purchase an automobile. X 1 is to choose the model, either a convertible (C) or a sedan (S), X 2 is to choose the manufacturer, either domestic (D) or foreign (F), and X 3 is to choose the color, either red (R) or green (G). The action spaces are A 1 = {C, S}, A 2 = {D, F}, A 3 = {R, G}. The expression
(1) means that concordance is higher (i.e., it is less conflictive) for the sub-collective {X 1 , X 2 } if X 1 were to most-prefer a foreign-made red convertible and, simultaneously, X 2 were to most-prefer a domesticmade green sedan, than if X 1 were to most-prefer a domestic green sedan and, simultaneously, X 2 were to most-prefer a foreign-made red convertible. Thus, even though the two stakeholders do not have the same preferences in either case, the severity of the differences in opinion is less for the
Next, the expression
means that X 1 prefers a foreign-made red convertible to a domestic-made green sedan, given the hypothesis that X 2 most-prefers a foreign-made red convertible. Notice that, since the consequent involves only one stakeholder, the conditional joint conjecture ordering becomes a conditional ordering, and we may more properly replace (2) with the expression
Continuing with this example, the expression
means that X 1 prefers a domestic-made green sedan to a foreign-made red convertible, given the hypothesis that X 2 most-prefers a foreign-made red convertible and that X 3 most-prefers a domestic-made green sedan. We conclude this example by examining the following expression.
means that the sub-collective {X 2 , X 3 } is less conflicted, given that X 1 most-prefers (S, D, G), for X 2 and X 3 to prefer (C, F, R) and (S, F, R), respectively, than respectively to most-prefer (S, D, G) and
Computing the concordance utility of a group X X X n = {X 1 , . . . , X n } is a key component of our approach, since that function captures all social relationships that exist in the group. Using this function, we can define notions of rational behavior both for the group as a whole and for each of its members. To proceed, we require the following principle.
Principle 2 (Endogeny). If a concordance ordering for a group of agents exists, it must be determined by the social interactions among the subsets of the group.
This principle precludes the exogenous imposition of aggregation structures. For example, a common conventional aggregation procedure is to form the weighted sum of individual utilities. Such a structure, however, is appropriate only under conditions of preferential independence (e.g., see (Debreu, 1959; Keeney and Raiffa, 1993) ). When preferential dependencies exist, however, we seek an aggregation structure that naturally emerges from within the group.
Given the existence of a concordance utility U Xm and a conditional concordance utility U X k |Xm , our goal is to compute the concordance utility of the union of the two subgroups; i.e., to form U XmX k , the concordance utility for X X X m ∪X X X k .
Definition 5.
Let X X X k = {X i 1 , . . . , X i k } and X X X m = {X j 1 , . . . , X j m } be two disjoint subgroups of X X X n such that U Xm and U X k |Xm are defined. These utilities are CONDITIONAL GAME THEORY -A Generalization of Game Theory for Cooperative Multiagent Systems endogenously aggregated if there exists a function F such that
When social relationships exist among the members of a collective, there may not be a unique way to represent them mathematically. Let us illustrate this situation by returning to the car-buying example introduced above.
Example 2. Let X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 be as defined in Example 1. Let us suppose that X 1 possesses a categorical utility u X 1 over A A A , but that X 2 possesses a conditional utility of the form u X 2 |X 1 ; that is, X 2 conditions its preferences on the preferences of X 1 . Ignoring, for the time being, the presence of X 3 , let us consider the aggregation of the utilities u X 1 and u X 2 |X 1 to form the sub-collective utility u X 1 X 2 . As thus framed, the goal is to define a function F such that
Now let us suppose that there is a well-defined social relationship between X 1 and X 2 such that, when defining their preferences, they both take into consideration that, ultimately, they will be operating in a group environment, and not in isolation. Under these conditions, it is possible to re-frame the scenario by X 2 defining a categorical utility u X 2 and X 1 defining a conditional utility u X 1 |X 2 . Under this framing, the aggregation problem requires
Principle 3 (Consistency). If a multiagent decision problem can be framed in more than one way using exactly the same information, all such framings should yield the same aggregated concordance ordering.
Definition 6.
Let X X X k and X X X m be two disjoint subgroups of X X X n and suppose there exist two framings of the preferences and relationships between the two subgroups of the forms {U X k ,U Xm|X k } and {U Xm ,U X k |Xm }. The endogenous aggregation is consistent if
AGGREGATION OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES
One of the major aims of our development is to define a mechanism from which a notion of group preference ordering can emerge from the aggregation of conditional individual preference orderings. An essential characteristic of any such mechanism is that it must possess the following property. Principle 4 invokes the common sense concept that, in the absence of opposition, the group must not arbitrarily override the wishes of individuals. Thus, if X 1 prefers a to a ′ and X 2 is indifferent between the two profiles, the group {X 1 , X 2 } should not prefer a ′ to a. In terms of utilities, this condition means that F must be nondecreasing in both arguments.
Principle 4 (Monotonicity
When modeling influence relationships, it is critical that we delimit generality to ensure computational tractability. We thus propose the following principle.
Principle 5 (Acyclicity). No cycles occur in the influence relationships among the agents.
Given two disjoint subgroups X X X k and X X X m of X X X n , acyclicity means that it cannot happen that, simultaneously, X X X m directly influences X X X k and X X X k directly influences X X X m . The fact that cycles are not permitted does reduce the generality of the model. Nevertheless, restricting to one-way influence relationships is a significant generalization of the neoclassical approach, which assumes that all utilities are categorical and, hence, are trivially acyclical.
The Aggregation Theorem
It remains to define a function F that complies with the above-mentioned principles. Since positive affine transformations preserve the mathematical integrity of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, we may assume, without loss of generality, that all utilities are non-negative and normalized to sum to unity; that is,
Theorem 1 (The Aggregation Theorem). Let X X X n = {X 1 , . . . , X n } be an n-member multiagent system and let B m denote the set of all m-element subgroups of
be a family of normalized non-negative concordance utilities and let 
This theorem was originally introduced by (Cox, 1946) as an alternative development of the mathematical syntax of probability theory. The proof below follows (Jaynes, 2003) .
Proof of the Aggregation Theorem. Let X X X i , X X X j , and X X X k be arbitrary pairwise disjoint subgroups of X X X n , and
and U X i be endogenously aggregated concordance utilities. That is,
and
Substituting (16) into (14) and (17) into (15) yields
In terms of general arguments, this equation becomes
called the associativity equation. By direct substitution it is easy to see that (19) is satisfied if
for any function f . It has been shown by (Cox, 1946) that if F is differentiable in both arguments, then (20) is the general solution to (19). Taking f as the identity function, F(x, y) = xy, and
To prove the converse, we note that F given by (13) is nondecreasing in both arguments since U X k and U Xm|X k are nonnegative. Also, since the subgroups X X X m and X X X k are arbitrary, (13) holds if we reverse the roles of m and k. Thus, consistency is satisfied and the aggregation is endogenous.
The aggregation theorem establishes that, upon compliance with the aforementioned principles, utility aggregation conforms to the same mathematical syntax as does probability. Consequently, the various epistemological properties of probability theory can be accorded analogous interpretations in the praxeological context. Key concepts in this regard are marginalization, independence, and the chain rule.
Marginalization. Let X X X m = {X j 1 , . . . , X j m } and X X X k = {X i 1 , . . . , X i k } be disjoint subgroups of X X X n . Then the marginal concordance utility of X X X m is obtained by summing over A A A k , yielding
Independence. Let X X X m and X X X k be disjoint subgroups of X X X n . These subgroups are praxeologically independent if neither subgroup influences the other; that is,
The Chain Rule. Let X X X m , X X X k , and X X X l be pairwise disjoint subgroups of X X X n . Then
The chain rule is the mechanism by which individual conditional utilities can be aggregated to form the concordance utility. To see, let us first recall that the acyclicity principle ensures that at least one agent possesses a categorical utility. Without loss of generality, let us assume this condition holds for X 1 . Successively applying the chain rule, we obtain U X 1 ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = u Xn (a n |a n−1 , . . . , a 1 ) u X n−1 (a n−1 |a n−2 , . . . , a 1 ) · · · u X 1 (a 1 ). (25)
Utility Networks
Since the influence flows are acyclic, we may represent the multiagent system as a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Furthermore, since the utilities that comply with the aggregation theorem possess the mathematical syntax of probability mass functions, the edges of the DAG are conditional utilities. We shall term such a graph a utility network, and note that it possesses all of the properties of a Bayesian network, albeit with different semantics (e.g., see (Pearl, 1988; Cowell et al., 1999) ).
Definition 7. The parent set for X i , denoted pa (X i ), is the subgroup of agents whose preferences directly influence X i . The child set of X i , denoted ch (X i ), is the subgroup that is directly influenced by X I .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the vertices of the network are enumerated such that all children of any given node have a higher-numbered index, otherwise the indexing is arbitrary. We may then rewrite (25) as
where pa (a i ) = {a i 1 , . . . , a i p i } is the joint conjecture corresponding to pa
To illustrate, consider the network illustrated in Figure 1 . X 1 is a root vertex, and possesses a categorical utility u X 1 , pa (X 2 ) = {X 1 }, and pa (X 3 ) = {X 1 , X 2 }. The concordance utility is If the utilities of all agents are categorical, then no social influence exists, the corresponding DAG has no edges, and, hence, no social bonds are generated. The game reverts to its traditional neoclassical form. The aggregation formula defined by (26) becomes analogous to the creation of the joint distribution of independent random variables as the product of the marginal distributions, and aggregation sheds no additional light on group behavior. 
CONDITIONAL GAMES
A conditional game is a triple {X X X n ,A A A ,U Xn } where X X X n = {X 1 , . . . , X n } is a group of n agents with product action space A A A = A 1 × · · · × A n and U Xn = U X 1 ···Xn is a concordance utility. Equivalently, by application of (26), a conditional game can be defined in terms of the conditional utilities u X i | pa (X i ) , i = 1, . . . , n. If all utilities are categorical, a conditional game becomes a conventional game.
With a conditional game, the possibility exists for an expanded notion of rational behavior. To proceed, we observe that, since each agent can control only its own actions, what is of interest is the utility for the group if all agents make conjectures over, and only over, their own action spaces.
Definition 8.
Consider the concordance utility U X 1 ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Let a i j denote the jth element of a i ; that is, a i = (a i1 , . . . , a in ) is X i 's conjecture. Next, form the action profile (a 11 , . . . , a nn ) by taking the ith element of each X i 's conjecture, i = 1, . . . , n. Now let us sum the concordance utility over all elements of each a i except the ii-th elements to form the social welfare function for {X 1 , . . . , X n }, yielding
where ∑ ¬a ii means the sum is taken over all a i j except a ii . The individual welfare function of X i is the i-th marginal of w X 1 ···Xn , that is,
The social welfare function provides a complete ex post description of the relationships between the members of a multiagent system as characterized by their ex ante conditional utilities. Unless the members of the system are praxeoloically independent, the ex post utility is not simply an aggregation of individual utilities, as is the case with classical social choice theory. Rather, it constitutes a meso to macro/micro propagation of preferences: from the intermediate, or meso, level, derived from local influences between the agents in the form of conditional preferences, up to the global, or macro, level and down to the individual, or micro, level, as illustrated in Figure 2 .
We define the maximum social welfare solution as
Also, the maximum individual welfare solution is
If a † i = a * i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the action profile is a consensus choice. In general, however, a consensus will not obtain, and negotiation may be required to reach a compromise solution.
The existence of group and individual welfare functions provides a rational basis for meaningful negotiations; namely, that any compromise solution must at least provide each agent with its security level; that is, the maximum guaranteed benefit it could receive regardless of the decisions that others might make. The security level for X i is
In addition to individual benefit, we must also consider benefit to the group. Although a security level, per se, for the group cannot be defined in terms of a guaranteed benefit (after all, the group, as a single entity, does not actually make a choice), a possible rationale is that the benefit to the group it should never be less than the smallest guaranteed benefit to the individuals. This approach is consistent with the principles of justice espoused by (Rawls, 1971) , who argues, essentially, that a society as a whole cannot be better off than its least advantaged member. Accordingly, let us define a security level for the group as s X 1 ···Xn = min i {s X i }/n, where we divide by the number of agents since the utility for the group involves n players. Now define the group negotiation set
the individual negotiation sets
and the negotiation rectangle
Finally, define the compromise set
If C X 1 ···Xn = ∅, then no rational compromise is possible at the stated security levels. One way to overcome this impasse is to decrement the security level of the group iteratively by a small amount, thereby gradually
ter the maximum reduction in group security has been reached, then no rational compromise is possible, and the system may be considered dysfunctional. Another way to negotiate is for individual members to decrement their security levels iteratively, thereby enlarging the negotiation rectangle.
Once C X 1 ···Xn = ∅, any element of this set provides each member, as well as the group, with at least its security level. One possible tie-breaker is a c = arg max
which provides the maximum benefit to the group such that each of its members achieves at least its security level.
PARTIAL SOCIATION
Our development thus far has assumed the full generality of conditioning; namely, that (i) a conditional utility depends on the entire conjecture profiles of all of the parents, and (ii) an agent's conditional utility is a function of all elements of the action profile. If maximum complexity is required to define social relationships properly, the full power of conditional game theory may be necessary. It is often the case, however, that the influence relationships are sparse, in that an agent does not condition its preferences on the entire conjecture profiles of its parents. It can also be the case that an agent's utility does not depend upon the entire action profile. To account for such situations, we introduce the notion of sociation. Suppose X i has p i > 0 parents, denoted pa (X i ) = {X i 1 , . . . , X i p i }, with conditional utility u X i | pa(X i ) (pa (a i )), where pa (a i ) = {a i 1 , . . . , a i p i } is the joint conjecture for pa (X i ).
Definition 9.
A conjecture subprofile, for X i k , denotedâ i k , is the subprofile comprising the elements of of a i k that influence X i . We then have
where pa (â i ) =â i 1 , . . . ,â i p i ). {X 1 , . . . , X n } is completely conjecture sociated ifâ i k = a i k for k = 1, . . . , p i and i = 1, . . . , n. It is completely conjecture dissociated ifâ i k = a i k for k = 1, . . . , p i and i = 1, . . . , n, in which case, pa (â i ) = (a i 1 , . . . , a i p i ) . Otherwise, the group is partially conjecture sociated.
Definition 10. A utility subprofile, denotedã i , comprises the subprofile of a i that affects X i 's utility. We then have
whereũ denotes u with the dissociated arguments removed. {X 1 , . . . , X n } is completely utility sociated if a j = a j for i = 1, . . . , n. It is completely utility dissociated ifã i = a i for i = 1, . . . , n, in which case
Otherwise, the group is partially utility sociated.
Definition 11. A group {X 1 , . . . , X n } is completely dissociated if it is both completely conjecture dissociated and completely utility dissociated, in which case, pa (a i ) = pa(a i ) = (a i 1 , . . . , a i p i ) , the profile of conjecture actions of the members of pa (X i ).
For a partially sociated system, the concordance utility assumes the form
whereŨ is U with the dissociated arguments removed. For a completely dissociated group, the concordance utility coincides with the social welfare function and assumes the form
Example 3. Let us now reconsider the automobile buying example introduced in Example 1. We shall assume that the influence flows are as depicted in Figure 1 , with the corresponding concordance utility of the form expressed by (27), yielding If all agents have opinions about the model, manufacturer, and color attributes, then each agent must specify utility valuations for each of the eight possible outcomes. Thus, X 1 would specify eight utility values. X 2 , however, would need to define eight conditional utilities, each with eight valuations, and thus would make 64 utility specifications. Finally, X 3 would define 64 conditional utilities, each with eight valuations, and thus would make 512 utility specifications -a formidable task. Now let us suppose that X 1 is concerned only about the model and manufacturer, but has no opinion about the color. Also, we assume that X 2 is concerned only about the manufacturer given X 1 's conjecture about the model and manufacturer. Finally, let us assume that X 3 is concerned only about the color given X 1 's conjecture about the model and X 2 's conjecture about the manufacturer.
As a result of these simplifications, we see that X 1 is partially utility sociated, thusã 1 = (a 11 , a 12 ) . We also see that X 2 is completely utility dissociated and partially conjecture sociated, henceã 2 = a 22 and pa (a 22 ) = (a 11 , a 12 ). Finally, X 3 is also completely utility dissociated and partially conjecture sociated, thusã 3 = a 33 and pa(a 33 ) = (a 11 , a 22 ) . Thus, the concordance utility simplifies tõ U X 1 X 2 X 3 (a 11 , a 12 , a 22 , a 33 ) =ũ X 1 (a 11 , a 12 ) u X 2 |X 1 (a 22 |a 11 , a 12 )ũ X 3 |X 1 X 2 (a 33 |a 11 , a 22 ). (45) Under these simplifications, we see that X 1 need only make four specifications when definingũ X 1 , X 2 need make two specifications for each of X 1 's four specifications, resulting in eight specifications when definingũ X 2 |X 1 , and X 3 need make two specifications for each of the four joint specifications of X 1 and X 2 , resulting in eight specifications when defining u X 3 |X 1 X 2 , yielding a grand total of 20 utility specifications -a considerable reduction in complexity from the 584 specifications required under the condition of complete sociation (and even less than the 24 specifications needed to define categorical utilities). Tables 1, 2 , and 3 respectively tabulate X 1 's categorical utility, X 2 's conditional utilities given X 1 's conjectures, and X 3 's conditional utilities given the conjectures for X 1 and X 2 . The social welfare function w X 1 X 2 X 3 is illustrated in Table 4 , and the individual welfare functions are as w X 1 (C) = 0.5 w X 1 (S) = 0.5 (46) w X 2 (D) = 0.49 w X 2 (F) = 0.51 (47) w X 3 (R) = 0.426 w X 3 (G) = 0.574. The group negotiation set is N X 1 X 2 X 3 =
{(C, D, G), (C, F, G), (S, F, R)} and the negotia-
tion rectangle is R X 1 X 2 X 3 = {(C, F, G), (S, F, G)}, yielding the compromise set C X 1 X 2 X 3 = {(C, F, G)}: a green foreign-made convertible.
CONCLUSIONS
As acknowledged by many decision theorists (Arrow, 1986; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Shubik, 1982) , neoclassical game theory is an appropriate model for competitive and market-driven scenarios, but it is offers limited capacity for the design and synthesis of multiagent systems that are intended to cooperate, compromise, and negotiate. This paper (i) presents a principle-based extension to neoclassical game theory that replaces categorical utilities with conditional utilities that encode the social influence relationships that exist among the agents; (ii) develops notions of rational multiagent decision making to define rational behavior simultaneously for groups and for individuals; and (iii) addresses computational complexity by maximally exploiting influence sparseness among the agents. Conditional game theory provides a powerful framework within which to design and synthesize cooperative multiagent systems.
